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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Democratic Leader
Nancy Pelosi, and the following congressional leaders and leaders of the relevant
committees of jurisdiction:
Sen. Dick Durbin
(Assistant Majority Leader)

Rep. Steny H. Hoyer
(House Democratic Whip)

Sen. Charles Schumer
(Conference Vice Chair)

Rep. James E. Clyburn
(Democratic Assistant Leader)

Sen. Patty Murray
(Conference Secretary)

Rep. John B. Larson
(Chair of Democratic Caucus)

Sen. Max Baucus
(Chair, Committee on Finance)

Rep. Xavier Becerra
(Vice Chair of Democratic Caucus)

Sen. Tom Harkin
(Chair, Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions)

Rep. John D. Dingell
(Sponsor of House Health Care
reform legislation)

Sen. Patrick Leahy
(Chair, Committee on the Judiciary)

Rep. Henry A. Waxman
(Ranking Member, Committee on
Energy and Commerce)

Sen. Barbara Mikulski
(Chair, HELP Subcommittee on
Retirement and Aging)

Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.
(Ranking Member, Commerce
Subcommittee on Health)

Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV
(Chair, Committee on Commerce)

Rep. Sander M. Levin
(Ranking Member, Committee on
Ways and Means)
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Rep. George Miller
(Ranking Member, Education and the
Workforce Committee)

Rep. John Conyers, Jr.
Rep. Robert E. Andrews
(Ranking Member, Education and
(Ranking Member, Committee on the
Workforce Subcommittee on Health) Judiciary)
Rep. Jerrold Nadler
(Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Constitution)
Amici file this brief for two reasons.1 First, as elected Members of Congress,
amici have a duty to support the Constitution, and in exercise of that duty they write
to defend the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
The Act, closely debated in Congress and around the country for well over a year, is
a landmark accomplishment of the national Legislature, which brings to fruition a
decades-long effort to guarantee comprehensive, affordable, and secure health care
insurance for all Americans. Amici paid careful attention to Supreme Court
precedents defining the proper bounds of Congress’s constitutional authority, and
relied upon these established rules, in formulating, debating, and voting on the Act.
They wish to put before the Court their views on why the Act is a valid exercise of
Congress’s Article I powers.

1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), amici state that all parties consent
to the filing of this brief.
2
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Second, amici believe that Appellants’ legal theories, if embraced by the
courts, would seriously undermine Congress’s constitutional authority and its
practical ability to address pressing national problems. Congress regularly relies on
its enumerated powers to protect American consumers and workers, keep families
safe, and ensure civil rights. Amici take seriously their oath to “support and defend
the Constitution of the United States,” and write in their constitutional role as
Members of a coequal branch of government.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The central and dispositive fact in this case is that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“the Act” or “ACA”), including the provision that individuals
maintain minimum health insurance coverage, is a congressional regulation of the
interstate health insurance market. The effective regulation of health insurance,
moreover, is critical to the effective functioning of the enormously important
national health care market. The assertion that Congress lacks the legislative
authority to regulate these national, commercial markets is an astonishing
proposition. Its acceptance would mean that the Commerce Clause falls short of
authorizing the full and effective regulation of interstate commerce. That novel
claim is inconsistent with the Constitution and contrary to longstanding Supreme
Court precedent. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (the
3
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commerce power is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution … in plain
terms”).
The ACA includes a minimum coverage requirement (“MCR”) as part of its
comprehensive regulatory plan designed to ensure that affordable health insurance
coverage is widely available. The MCR is accompanied by a penalty provision
applicable to most taxpayers that encourages individuals who lack adequate health
insurance to obtain coverage that meets minimum standards. Congress determined
after exhaustive hearings that without this financial incentive for individuals to
maintain adequate coverage, it would not be financially practicable to prohibit
insurance companies from denying coverage to those with pre-existing conditions or
otherwise to regulate effectively the national markets in health insurance and health
care.
Appellants, however, urge this court to carve out an unprecedented exception
to Congress’s plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce. They contend that
even matters vital to the national economy may not be regulated if they fall within an
artificial category that Appellants call “inactivity.” This is descriptively inaccurate,
because (1) the penalty for failing to maintain minimum coverage applies only to
those who participate in the economy by earning sufficient taxable income that they
4
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are otherwise required to file federal income tax returns and (2) virtually everyone
subject to the penalty participates in some way in the health care market in any given
year even if they choose not to purchase health insurance. Moreover, the Supreme
Court long ago rejected using arbitrary characterizations to constrain Congress’s
power to regulate the national economy. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 556 (1995).
There is nothing unprecedented about Congress imposing requirements on
citizens who would prefer to be left alone, when those regulations are necessary to
accomplish an objective wholly within the powers assigned to Congress. Nor is
there anything so surprising or severe about the provision in question that would
suggest that it crosses some constitutional boundary and must thus be judicially
excised. The provision is no more intrusive than Social Security or Medicare. The
Social Security Act requires individuals to make payments to provide for their
retirement. Medicare requires individuals to make payments to provide for their
health coverage after they are 65 years of age or if they meet other criteria. The
ACA requires individuals to obtain health coverage before they are 65. Under
Medicare, there is one predominant payer, the government, and individuals choose
between privately insured plans or a government-administered plan that relies on
private providers. Under the ACA, individuals are given an option to choose among
5
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insurers in the private market. Neither Social Security nor Medicare nor the ACA is
such a novel intrusion into liberty that judges would be justified in overriding the
considered judgment of the elected branches that adopted those laws.
As members of Congress, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s concern,
stated in cases such as Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000),
that Congress not use the commerce power to regulate matters that are local and
non-economic. Those cases involved the attempt to regulate local crime (guns near
schools and violence against women) because of a presumed ultimate effect on
interstate commerce. The MCR, in contrast, is itself a regulation of an interstate
commercial matter– health insurance. The effective functioning of that major
commercial activity is critical to the national health care market in which virtually
every American participates. This case tests no limits and approaches no slippery
slope. Notwithstanding Appellants’ improbable hypotheticals, Congress never has
required Americans to exercise or eat certain foods – and in our view it never would.
Were Congress ever to consider laws of that kind infringing on personal autonomy,
the judiciary would have ample tools under the liberty clause of the Fifth
Amendment to identify and enforce constitutional limits. See Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). What the ACA regulates is not personal
autonomy, but commercial transactions.
6
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Suggestions that sustaining the MCR would mean that Congress could
mandate the purchase of cars or comparable items are also disingenuous. The
provision requiring minimum health insurance cannot be viewed in isolation. In this
case, Congress has regulated a unique market, insurance that provides a means of
paying for health care services. Health care is a unique product that no one can be
certain he or she will never utilize, as the court below noted, “[r]egardless of whether
one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the backstop of free or
reduced-cost emergency room services” to address the financial risks. Op. at *27.
The MCR regulates participation in this singular market, which plays a central
role in the nation’s commerce. And were there any doubt that the MCR is a valid
exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides
a reinforcing and independent basis for the provision’s constitutionality. The
minimum coverage provision is a valid means to the full and effective exercise of
Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce in the larger Act.
Appellants’ disagreement with the manner Congress has chosen to regulate
two related and important national markets is an occasion for political debate, not a
matter for judicial imposition. Amici stand by the wisdom of the Act, which expands
quality, affordable insurance to millions of Americans while limiting costs and

7
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reducing the deficit. But, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote for the Supreme Court
nearly 75 years ago:
Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of [the statute in
question], it is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come from
Congress, not the courts.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the
Social Security Act of 1935).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
INCLUDING ITS MINIMUM COVERAGE REQUIREMENT, IS A
VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S ENUMERATED
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE
AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES.
A.

Congress Has Plenary Authority To Regulate Interstate Markets,
Including Matters Affecting The Prices Of Commodities Traded
In Interstate Commerce.

The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power … To regulate
Commerce … among the several States.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In decisions reaching
back to the early years of the Republic, the Supreme Court has recognized that this
crucial provision grants Congress plenary power to regulate the nation’s commercial
affairs. For, as the Supreme Court recently observed, “The Commerce Clause
emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the
Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of
Confederation.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).
8
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Almost two hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause “is plenary as to [its] objects” and
“co-extensive with the subject itself.” Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197. Numerous
decisions establish that when Congress regulates an interstate market it acts within
the core of the Commerce Clause – and that “the power to regulate commerce …
extends” not just to the literal commercial transactions of the relevant market but
also to behavior or acts “which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise
of the power to regulate commerce” in that market. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90. Thus, “Congress, of
course, can do anything which, in the exercise by itself of a fair discretion, may be
deemed appropriate to save the act of interstate commerce from prevention or
interruption, or to make that act more secure, more reliable, or more efficient.”
Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 48 (1912). Congress’s commerce
power is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution.” Gibbons,
22 U.S. at 196 (quoted in Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981)).
It has long been settled, therefore, that “Congress plainly has power to
regulate the price” of products “distributed through the medium of interstate
9
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commerce [and] possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.”
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942). In doing so,
Congress may decide “to give protection to sellers or purchasers or both.” Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939). “It is of the essence of the plenary power conferred
that Congress may exercise its discretion in the use of the power…. Congress may
consider and weigh relative situations and needs.” Id. at 14. The Court’s modern
cases reaffirm that the commerce power authorizes the regulation of any matter that
“affects the price structure and federal regulation of” an interstate market. Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971).
In two recent cases, Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that Congress cannot
use an attenuated connection to interstate commerce to enact laws governing purely
local, non-commercial matters. Those cases involved provisions governing criminal
behavior – possessing guns near a school and gender-motivated violence – with no
immediate connection to any interstate market. The Court cautioned against
reasoning that would permit congressional regulation of matters unrelated to the
national economy by “pil[ing] inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. In order to
maintain the constitutional principle that Congress is a legislature of limited and
10
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enumerated powers, Lopez and Morrison identified a limiting principle to the
instrumental use of the commerce power to regulate non-commercial matters: the
gap between some local, non-economic matter that Congress wishes to regulate and
interstate commerce cannot be bridged by pointing to a remote causal relationship.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
The Court has made clear that the limitation applied in Lopez and Morrison
does not detract from Congress’s plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce
itself. In Raich, the Court reaffirmed that where “the [act under review] is a statute
that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts
no doubt on its constitutionality.” 545 U.S. at 26. Indeed, the “case law firmly
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities” as part of interstate
commerce regulation. Id. at 17; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (confirming
Congress’s unquestioned regulatory authority “where a general regulatory statute
bears a substantial relation to commerce” (emphasis omitted)). As Justice Kennedy
explained, “Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that
we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

11
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The Act, Of Which The Minimum Coverage Requirement Is An
Integral Part, Is A Constitutional Regulation Of Interstate
Commerce.
1.

The Commerce Clause authorizes the minimum coverage
requirement as congressional regulation of the national
health insurance market.

The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the Commerce Clause
authorizes Congress to regulate “the business of insurance”: “[t]hat power, … is
vested in the Congress, available to be exercised for the national welfare as Congress
shall deem necessary.” United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533,
552-53 (1944).
In the Act, Congress set forth findings about the central role of health
insurance in the U.S. economy. In 2009, the U.S. spent more than 17% of its gross
domestic product on health care. ACA § 10106(a). Despite that expense, some 45
million Americans lacked health insurance for at least part of the year before
enactment of the ACA. One reason so many Americans lacked health insurance is
that prior to the ACA, insurers designed practices to exclude those most in need of
medical care, often by avoiding coverage of people with pre-existing conditions.
Given that as many as 129 million Americans under 65 have some pre-existing
condition, Dept. of Health & Human Svcs., At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could
Affect 1 in 2 Americans (2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/
12
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preexisting.html, these practices placed numerous families at risk for loss of health
insurance.
Uninsured Americans are not immune from injury, sickness, and the need for
medical services. According to recent reports, 94% of the long-term uninsured have
received some medical care. June E. O’Neill & Dave M. O’Neill, Who Are the
Uninsured? An Analysis of America’s Uninsured Population, Their Characteristics,
and their Health 20-22 (2009). When Americans lack health insurance, they often
resort to treatment in emergency rooms: according to one study, in 2007, 62.6% of
the uninsured at a given point in time had made at least one visit to a doctor or
emergency room within the year. Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States,
2009, at 318.
America is a charitable and caring nation, and the uninsured are, in many
instances, provided basic health care with the cost passed on to other participants in
the market. A federal statute requires as much. See Emergency Medical Treatment
and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. The cost of medical care for the uninsured is
shifted through the interstate market. In 2008, such cost-shifting amounted to $43
billion, see Congressional Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health
Insurance Proposals 114 (Dec. 2008), creating a hidden burden passed along to
other market participants through increased fees and premiums and to taxpayers
13
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through burdens on the public fisc. Congress, in passing the Act, understood that
barriers to full coverage in the health insurance market have substantial economic
effects extending beyond the health care sector. See, e.g., ACA § 10106 (medical
expenses contribute to 62% of personal bankruptcies).
The Act regulates the health insurance market to protect the American people
by barring insurers from refusing or rescinding coverage based on pre-existing
conditions, establishing new insurance markets, and promoting access to affordable
insurance. It also requires individuals, with certain specified exceptions, to maintain
minimum levels of health care coverage or (in some cases) pay a tax penalty. The
Act as a whole is thus a core exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power to
regulate the interstate health insurance industry.
The challenged component of the Act, the MCR, fits within Congress’s
enumerated Commerce Clause authority because (1) on its own it regulates this
interstate market, and (2) it is an integral part of Congress’s broader regulatory
scheme of assuring affordable health care insurance coverage for all Americans.
First, the MCR directly addresses the affordability of health insurance and
therefore (in light of the basic principle that insurance rests on the pooling of risks)
its availability in the private market. As Congress explained, the MCR “regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial
14
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decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is
purchased.” ACA § 1501(a)(2)(A). Congress acted for the purposes of “giv[ing]
protection to sellers [and] purchasers” and stabilizing “the price structure” of the
health care insurance market – regulatory purposes the Supreme Court has long
recognized as within the core of the commerce power. See Currin, 306 U.S. at 11;
Perez, 402 U.S. at 151. As with the law in Raich, the MCR regulates commerce by
addressing “supply and demand in the national market” for health insurance. See
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
As a matter of economic fact, whether an individual purchases health
insurance, self-insures, or ignores the issue altogether is one element in the mass of
decisions (and failures to decide) that determine the cost, and thus availability, of
health insurance in the market. It is “economic” in a common-language or business
sense: health insurance, unlike carrying guns near schools, is a product which people
buy and sell. The Court employs a “practical conception of commercial regulation.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 n.35 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). It is “well established” that the commerce power “includes the power
to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in.” Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). The failure to obtain health insurance affects
the cost of health insurance for others and, in the future, for oneself.
15
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Second, in the Act, Congress expressly found that the MCR “is an essential
part of this larger regulation of economic activity,” the absence of which “would
undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market.” ACA § 10106.
Congress found that the MCR is “essential” for a simple reason: otherwise, the new
regulations would encourage individuals to delay or forgo insurance, knowing that
they could not be excluded later for pre-existing conditions. That would cause
higher insurance prices and greater cost-shifting. The MCR, however, will
“significantly reduce[] the uninsured” and “together with the [Act’s] other
provisions … lower health insurance premiums.” Id.
When Congress creates a “comprehensive regulatory regime,” it may regulate
a particular matter if the “failure to regulate ... would leave a gaping hole in the”
statutory regime. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. Without the MCR, the objective of the
Act’s regulation of interstate commerce would be far more difficult, if not
impossible, to attain. “Leaving [individuals who do not purchase health care
insurance although financially able to do so] outside the regulatory scheme would
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions,” id. at 19, and so
undermine Congress’s objectives. The Court thus explained in Raich that, “[a]s we
have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of th[e]
larger scheme.” Id. at 22. The same rule holds here.
16

Case: 10-2347

Document: 43-1

Date Filed: 02/25/2011

Page: 23

Viewed through the lens of recent cases, the Act and its MCR exercise the
core of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558
(commerce power encompasses “the channels of interstate commerce ... the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce ... [and] activities affecting commerce”). The Act regulates the channels
of interstate commerce, which permit the existence of insurance markets. It also
regulates “things in interstate commerce” – insurance contracts and transactions.
See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 550 (insurance “involve[s] the
transmission of great quantities of money, documents, and communications across
dozens of state lines”). Finally, health insurance makes up a significant interstate
market itself and provides a means of payment for participants in the unique national
health care market, and so the MCR regulates matters “substantially affecting
interstate commerce.”

2.

The minimum coverage requirement is fully consistent with
limits on the Commerce Clause described in recent Supreme
Court decisions

The MCR, as a regulation of an economic market, also complies with the
limits on Congress’s authority articulated in Lopez and Morrison. The Act regulates
interstate commerce, not in order to reach some further, non-commercial behavior
but precisely in order to regulate a commercial market to achieve national purposes.
17
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There is thus no gap between the regulation and interstate commerce. As the
Supreme Court concluded in Raich, where Congress’s clear purpose is to regulate an
interstate market, the limiting principle of Lopez and Morrison is irrelevant. See
Raich, 545 U.S. at 26. We are sensitive to the Court’s concern that Congress not
overstep its authority by using its national commercial powers to regulate truly local
or non-economic matters that do not sufficiently affect commerce. But that is
simply not this case. No chain of inferences is necessary to relate the MCR to the
regulation of interstate commerce; instead, Congress is regulating a national market
– the very subject matter and purpose of the Commerce Clause.
The relevant limitation to the MCR is that expressed by the terms of the
Commerce Clause itself, and the MCR’s constitutionality rests on the fact that what
it regulates is interstate commerce. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408, 423 (1946) (“The only limitation [the Clause] places upon Congress’ power is
in respect to what constitutes commerce, including whatever rightly may be found to
affect it sufficiently to make Congressional regulation necessary or appropriate”).
Upholding a regulation of commerce itself poses no danger of transforming the
Commerce Clause into a federal police power.
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There Is No Constitutional Basis For Carving Out A Novel
Exception To Congress’s Recognized Power To Regulate
Interstate Commerce.
1.

Whether the minimum coverage requirement should be
categorized as activity or inactivity is an artificial distinction
irrelevant to the question of the Act’s constitutionality.

Appellants repeatedly proclaim a constitutional rule limiting the Commerce
Clause to regulations affecting economic “activities.” Appellants have
manufactured this supposed “rule” out of whole cloth. Their claim is simply
wordplay with the terminology found in some judicial opinions, none of which
concern a difference between action and inaction. Appellants’ claim rests on the
happenstance that some opinions have used that language.2 Neither in those
opinions nor in any other modern case has the Supreme Court suggested the
existence of any per se limitation on the commerce power based on such conceptual
categories. “[S]uch formulas are not provided by the great concepts of the
Constitution.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted). It is implausible that without saying so, and contrary to its

2

The Court uses other terms elsewhere. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262
U.S. 1, 37 (1923) (commerce power authorizes regulation of “‘[w]hatever amounts
to more or less constant practice and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden’”
interstate commerce) (quoting with approval Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495,
521 (1922)). Appellants’ theory is as futile as it would be to argue that the Court’s
use in Olsen and Stafford of the word “practice” limited the commerce power to
“practices” as opposed to “non-practices.”
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long-standing acknowledgment that the commerce power is plenary, the Court’s
choice of wording established a new category of matters related to commerce but
beyond congressional regulation because someone might not label them an
“activity.” See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
Moreover, the distinction between “activity” and “inactivity” proposed by
Appellants is an artificial one. Because, as discussed above, the vast majority of
uninsured Americans do seek and receive often expensive emergency medical care,
the choice to opt out of paying for health insurance is not the same as opting out of
the health care market. To the contrary, rather than choosing “inactivity” in the
health care market, the decision not to buy insurance shifts the profound costs to
people who do have health insurance in the form of higher premiums, with a
significant effect on the nationwide health insurance market.
The Court long ago concluded that “artificial” categories and “abstract
distinction[s]” provide no proper basis for constraining the scope of the commerce
power. See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 556 (pre-1937 distinction between “direct” and
indirect” effects abandoned because it “artificially had constrained the authority of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce”); id. at 572-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(approving Court’s rejection of “the abandoned abstract distinction between direct
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and indirect effects on interstate commerce”). Appellants’ argument is a novel
version of the same discarded mistake.
2.

Appellants’ proposed distinction between activity and
inactivity rests on a discredited substantive due process
theory of economic liberty that is not cognizable in a legal
action challenging a federal statute on Article I grounds.

Appellants’ real claim is that by imposing an obligation on certain Americans
to participate in a market at a particular time, the Act invades their economic
liberty.3 There is nothing novel about an argument that legislation regulating
economic liberty violates the Constitution: such arguments sound in what we now
call economic substantive due process, and associate with the famous decision in
Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Appellants mention neither Lochner
nor economic substantive due process, and for good reason: the Supreme Court
rejected the doctrine many decades ago. “The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner …
has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
Cast as a challenge to Congress’s Article I powers, Appellants’ theory fails even to
state a cognizable legal claim. The substantive powers enumerated in Article I
3

The District Court rejected a variety of claims premised on religious
freedom or equal protection. Amici agree with the court’s opinion and do not
address those issues.
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authorize Congress to impose obligations and duties on individuals. In the absence
of a violation of one of the Constitution’s prohibitions on legislative power,
Appellants’ claims are political arguments that can only receive a political remedy.
In any event, the claim that there is anything novel about the MCR because it
obligates citizens to take action or denies them the “right” to be left alone is wrong.4
Every time the federal government requires someone to move in order to build an
interstate highway, Congress is exercising the commerce power to require action by
individuals who might prefer inactivity to compensation for the taking. Congress
has put obligations on individuals at least since the Militia Act of 1792. In Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942), the Court upheld Commerce Clause legislation
despite the objection that the law “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what
they could provide for themselves.” In parallel fashion, the MCR forces some
taxpayers who benefit from the Act's health care protections “into the market” to
purchase health insurance despite claims they “could provide [it] for themselves” by

4

The MCR is not a novelty in the debate over health care. Legislation
requiring Americans to purchase health insurance was first introduced by
Republican Senators in 1993. See Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of
1993, S. 1770, 103rd Cong. In 2006, a Democratic legislature and Republican
governor in Massachusetts adopted a health reform law with an individual mandate.
And while Congress was formulating the Act in 2009, a plan released by former
Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, and Bob Dole through the
Bipartisan Policy Center also advocated an individual mandate.
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self-insurance. Neither in Wickard nor in the present case do these observations
even suggest a constitutional infirmity.
As these examples demonstrate, there is nothing unconstitutional or unusual
about legislation that requires individuals to bear some obligation to achieve a
broader public goal. In the present case, moreover, the MCR is simply “a
coordination mechanism to ensure that everyone participates in a well-functioning
private insurance market. By discouraging any one of us from free-riding, the
mandate allows each of us greater protection and more affordable coverage,” – just
like Social Security and Medicare. See Rahul Rajkumar & Harold Pollack, An
Essential Mandate, L.A. Times (Jan. 7, 2011). The Constitution presupposes the
legitimacy of legislative authority when exercised within its express limitations.
“There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses ... the
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.” W. Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (quotation omitted). When, as here,
Congress executes its enumerated powers, “the United States possesses the power ...
to regulate the conduct of the citizen [and thus] abridge his liberty or affect his
property.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934).
We agree with Appellants’ insistence that the Constitution is dedicated to the
principles of freedom. Nonetheless, it is unclear what Appellants think so severe
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about the Act as to be an unconstitutional interference with liberty. The
constitutional validity of Medicare is beyond question, yet Medicare requires
individual taxpayers to pay for health insurance they will need in old age. The
difference is that the MCR allows individual taxpayers to choose to purchase
insurance in the market or pay a penalty, while under Medicare taxpayers must pay
into the program. The MCR is thus arguably a less intrusive approach to achieving
Congress’s legislative purpose than Medicare, and therefore cannot be an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47,
59-60 (2006) (holding that where Congress could directly impose a requirement it
cannot be unconstitutional for Congress to permit private choices and impose
financial consequences). Moreover, the MCR does not require that people receive
particular medical care and, in fact, explicitly exempts those with a religious
objection to modern medicine. ACA § 10106(b)(1).
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation that places
obligations on individuals and imposes penalties for violating those obligations.
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940). Liberty under
our Constitution is liberty in a system authorizing the exercise of the governmental
authority the Constitution delegates to Congress. If they disagree with elements of
the Act, Appellants may address them in the proper, democratic forum.
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Upholding the Act and the minimum coverage requirement
would not render Congress’s Commerce Clause authority
without limits.

Appellants attempt to bolster their disguised Lochner claim by a slippery
slope argument that if the MCR is valid, “then Congress can force every American
to buy a General Motors vehicle” or “domestically grown vegetables.” App. Br. at
17. Consideration of the grave question of whether this Court must invalidate a
landmark act of Congress is not advanced by posing an absurd parade of
hypotheticals. In any event, it is erroneous to suggest that there is no principled
stopping point between recognizing the validity of a mandate related to an interstate
market, and imagined laws that would impinge on an individual’s bodily autonomy.
The Supreme Court long ago recognized a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in decisions about an individual’s bodily integrity. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79. In the unlikely event a Congress someday attempted to
invade such a personal liberty as the interest in refusing to eat a certain food, a
significant constitutional issue would be posed.
The judiciary possesses authority and doctrinal tools to address laws that
interfere oppressively with an individual’s physical integrity. It is quite unnecessary
to return to Lochner or deny Congress the authority to regulate an interstate market
25
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in order to prevent an Orwellian state. There is a familiar and principled distinction
between personal freedoms that the courts protect by searching analysis of
legislation restricting them, and “‘liberties which derive merely from shifting
economic arrangements.’” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 605, 651 (1972) (quoting
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Freedoms
related to the individual’s physical integrity come to the courts “‘with a momentum
for respect lacking when appeal is made to’” economic liberty. Id.
Even if this Court believes that principles of economic liberty might in some
case call for curtailing a congressional requirement that individuals participate in
some other market, two factors make the health insurance market unique. First, as
the Supreme Court has observed, insurance is uniquely and by definition “‘an
arrangement for transferring and distributing risk.’” Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (citation omitted). As a consequence, a
“fundamental object” of insurance “is to distribute … loss over as wide an area as
possible.” Id. at 212 (citation omitted). The power effectively to regulate the
pricing structure of an insurance market necessarily involves the power to regulate
the area over which the risks are spread – a characteristic of insurance that can be
said of no other market. Second, health care is distinctive in that almost every
individual will, at some point, require health care and yet the timing and costs of
26

Case: 10-2347

Document: 43-1

Date Filed: 02/25/2011

Page: 33

those needs are unpredictable: health insurance is, as a consequence, the only
practicable way in which health care can be financed. And existing state and federal
laws, which embody a basic and permanent commitment of the American people,
already require that the costs of health care for the uninsured are transferred to other
market participants, thus creating an inefficient and inequitable public substitute for
private insurance. The MCR merely regulates the unavoidable participation of
individuals in this singular market in order to make its financing more efficient and
eliminate its current inequities. Because this market is unique, Congress infringes
no general principle of liberty in ordering its activities in a unique way to increase
efficiency and eliminate inequity.
II.

CONGRESS ALSO HAS POWER UNDER THE NECESSARY AND
PROPER CLAUSE TO ADOPT THE MINIMUM COVERAGE
REQUIREMENT AS A MEANS CONGRESS DEEMS APPROPRIATE
AND CONDUCIVE TO ACCOMPLISH THE ENDS OF THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT.
The Constitution grants Congress certain enumerated powers, and also

authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution th[os]e foregoing Powers.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Because the MCR is a direct
regulation of interstate commerce, we think it unnecessary to consider Congress’s
additional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Were there any doubt
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that the MCR is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, however, the
provision is a valid means to the full and effective execution of the Act.5

A.

The Necessary And Proper Clause Empowers Congress To
Choose The Means Best Suited In Its Judgment To Execute Its
Express Powers, As Long As The Means Are Conducive To A
Constitutionally Legitimate Legislative End.

Since McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been settled law that the Necessary and
Proper Clause empowers Congress to choose those means that Congress deems
necessary to the effective exercise of its enumerated powers. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). As the Supreme Court held in
5

The Constitution also grants Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to … provide for the … general Welfare of the United
States[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This Clause provides an additional
constitutional basis for the MCR. In this case, the District Court correctly concluded
that the Act fit within Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and so it was
“unnecessary to consider whether the provisions would be constitutional exercises
of power pursuant to the General Welfare Clause.” Op. at *11. For the same reason,
amici do not cover this point in detail.
We note, nonetheless, that Congress’s General Welfare Clause power is
“extensive,” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867), and the MCR fits
well within this authority. The Act requires individuals to obtain coverage or pay a
penalty through the tax system. ACA § 1501(b). The tax penalty is codified in the
Internal Revenue Code; it applies only to taxpayers otherwise required to file
income tax returns; it is calculated with reference to an individual’s income; it is
assessed and collected like other tax penalties; and it is enforced by the Internal
Revenue Service. Congress expected the provision to raise revenue for the federal
government. In part because of the MCR, the Act is projected to reduce the budget
deficit by $143 billion over ten years. CBO Letter to Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
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McCulloch, the Clause does not limit Congress to choose only those means that are
necessary in some strictly logical sense, a rule that would render the federal
government unworkable. Id. at 415-16, 420-21. Rather, the Clause permits
Congress to adopt any means “appropriate” to the achievement of any legitimate
congressional purpose:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421. The Court recently reaffirmed the breadth of the Clause in United
States v. Comstock, where it recognized that the concern expressed in Lopez
about “pil[ing] inference on inference” has no place in analyzing a provision
that is a Necessary and Proper means to executing an enumerated power. 130
S. Ct. 1949, 1963 (2010) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
B.

The Minimum Coverage Requirement Is An Appropriate Means
Of Executing The Act’s Regulation Of The Interstate Health
Care Insurance Market, Is Plainly Adapted To The End Of
Assuring Affordable Health Care For All Americans, And
Violates No Constitutional Prohibition.

The Act’s purpose, to make affordable health insurance available to all
Americans, is a constitutionally legitimate end. See South-Eastern Underwriters,
322 U.S. at 552-53. As described above, Congress carefully explained why the
MCR is essential to the Act’s broader goal. Appellants present no plausible claim
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that the MCR violates any express constitutional prohibition; their suggestion that
the Necessary and Proper Clause itself imposes such a prohibition is contrary to both
principle and precedent.6 Since the MCR is “plainly adapted” to Congress’s
legitimate regulatory end, the provision is, plainly, valid under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
This conclusion is bolstered by two additional considerations. First, the
Court has maintained ever since McCulloch that Congress may choose any means it
deems “conducive to the complete accomplishment of [its] object” – that is,
appropriate to render its legislation completely effective. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at
424. The Necessary and Proper Clause does not invite courts to overturn Congress’s
choices because litigants may prefer that Congress seek its goals through different
measures.
Second, since McCulloch it has been clear that courts should not substitute
their views on which means are appropriate for those of the legislature. In
McCulloch, the Court explained that even if the constitutional “necessity” of a
national bank were “less apparent” than the Court believed, “none can deny its being
6

In Comstock, the Court repeatedly stressed the difference between the
Necessary and Proper Clause issue and any individual liberty claims in that case.
130 S. Ct. at 1954, 1956, 1957, 1965. The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be
used to repackage an individual-liberty argument, such as a Fifth Amendment
economic due process claim, into a claim about Congress’s Article I powers.
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an appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as has been very
justly observed, is to be discussed in another place” – that is, Congress. 17 U.S. at
423. Modern cases state this principle using the rational basis test: the Clause
requires that “a federal statute represent a rational means for implementing a
constitutional grant of legislative authority.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962. The
issue in this case is therefore not whether this Court concludes that the MCR is in
fact necessary to “the complete accomplishment” of Congress’s goals “but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; see also
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
Congress, through the Act, has used its constitutional powers to ensure that all
Americans have access to quality, affordable health care, while significantly
reducing long-term health care costs. Although Appellants may not agree with these
goals, they are well within Congress’s constitutional bounds.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court below should be affirmed.
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